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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCARSDALE POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent, 
#2A-11/7/75 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
-and-
VILLAGE OF SCARSDALE, CASE NO. U-1698 
Charging Party. 
The charge herein was filed by the Village of Scarsdale (Village) 
on July 14, 1975. It alleges that the Scarsdale Police Benevolent Association, 
Inc. (PBA) committed an improper practice in violation of Civil Service Law 
§209-a.2(b) by refusing to negotiate in good faith with the Village. The 
gravamen of the charge is that PBA has submitted several negotiating demands 
that do not constitute mandatory subjects of negotiations and that, over the 
objections of the Village, it continued to insist upon those demands even after 
the negotiations dispute was submitted to a factfinder. 
On September 29, 1975 the Village and the PBA entered into a 
stipulation in which they specified those demands of the PBA that the Village 
alleged to be non-mandatory subjects of negotiations; indicating the dispute was 
one that raised questions concerning the scope of negotiations, the parties 
jointly requested this Board to accord this matter expedited treatment, as 
provided in §204.4 of our Rules of Procedure. That request was granted and the 
parties were instructed to submit memoranda of law to us so as to reach us in 
advance of our meeting of October 24, 1975. This was done. 
Applicable Decisions 
Scope of negotiations under the Taylor Law has been considered by 
the Court of Appeals in Board of Education v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 
30 NY2d 122 (1972); Syracuse Teachers' Association v. Board of Educa^loj 
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35 NY 2d 743 (1974); West Irondequoit Teachers Association v. Helsby, 35 NY. 2d 
46 (1974); and Susquehanna Valley Central School District at Conklin v. 
Susquehanna Valley Teachers Association, NY 2d . ''' (1975). 
Most relevant of our own decisions are Matter of City School 
District of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB 3704 (1971); Matter of City of 
White Plains, 5 PERB 3013 (1972); Matter of City of Albany and Albany Police 
Officers Union, 7 PERB 3132 (1974); Matter of City of Albany and Albany Permanent 
Professional Firefighters Association, 7 PERB 3142 (1974); Matter of Board of 
Higher Education of the City of New York, 7 PERB 3042 (1974); and Matter of 
Yorktown Faculty Association, 7 PERB 3051 (1974). 
The above-cited Court of Appeals' decisions set forth the nature 
of the duty to negotiate. Public employers and recognized or certified employee 
organizations are under a duty to negotiate over terms and conditions of employ-
ment except to the extent that this duty is limited by plain and clear prohi-
bitions in a statute or in decisional law, or where an agreement would conflict 
with an essential public policy of the State. This concept was first articulatel 
by us in the New Rochelle case, in which we held (at page 3706): 
"A public employer exists to provide certain services to 
its constituents, be it police protection, sanitation or, 
as in the case of the employer herein, education. Of 
necessity, the public employer, acting through its executive 
or legislative body, must determine the manner and means by 
which such services are to be rendered and the extent thereof, 
subject to the approval or disapproval of the public so 
served, as manifested in the electoral process. Decisions 
of a public employer with respect to the carrying out of 
its mission, such as a decision to eliminate or curtail a 
service, are matters that a public employer should not be 
compelled to negotiate with its employees (footnote omitted)." 
In the White Plains and in the two Albany cases, we applied the New Rochelle 
concept to specific negotiations demands and determined that some were, and 
others were not, mandatory subjects of negotiations. In the Board of Higher 
Education of the City of New York and Yorktown cases, we determined that an 
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employee organization violates CSL §209-a.2(b) when it continues to insist 
upon non-mandatory subjects of negotiations during factfinding. 
Implications of Compulsory Arbitration 
In its brief, the Village notes that in past cases in which we 
have found a demand to constitute a mandatory subject of negotiations we 
occasionally remarked that an employer's arguments against being compelled to 
negotiate went to the merits of the proposal itself, rather than to the 
mandatory nature of its negotiability. The Village comments: 
"Generally, such a retort was satisfactory since, until 
recently, under the Taylor Law, a final agreement covering 
the terms and conditions of employment between a public 
employer and its employees required the assent of the 
elected representatives serving on the appropriate governing 
body. 
"However, since the advent of compulsory binding arbitration, 
a determination of an arbitrator may be imposed covering 
terms and conditions of employment without the assent of 
the representatives of the people." 
The Village concludes that the availability of compulsory arbitration requires 
a more restrictive definition of mandatory subjects of negotiations. This 
argument articulates an unhappiness with the statute itself. It was rejected 
by us in the two Albany cases. We find nothing in the language of the legis-
lation establishing compulsory arbitration that would impose restrictions upon 
the duty to negotiate over terms and conditions of employment. 
Discussion 
There now follows seriatum the demands of the PBA, the mandatory 
negotiability of which — according to the stipulation of the parties — is in 
question. 
Demand No. 2 - "All promotions are to be filled within thirty (30) days 
after vacancy." 
PBA argues in support of this demand that the filling of all 
vacancies, including supervisory vacancies, is important to protect the safety 
4024 
Board - U-1698 -4 
of the remaining employees. The Village responds that the demand would preclude 
it from effecting a staff reduction and is, therefore, not a mandatory subject 
of negotiations. We agree with the Village. A demand that would restrict 
reductions in staff size is a permissive and not a mandatory subject of nego-
tiations (see Susquehanna Valley Central School District at Conklin, supra). 
Demand No. 4 - "If any mechanical or safety defect in a patrol vehicle 
has been properly reported and not corrected within 2 days, 
such police vehicle shall be considered not fit for use by 
the Police department, and removed from service until the 
mechanical or safety defect has been corrected." 
The PBA justifies this demand on the ground that it is closely 
related to the safety of policemen. The Village objects on the ground that it 
goes beyond safety. It alleges that there may be mechanical defects in a 
vehicle that would not involve safety. It appears that the dispute between the 
parties is one of semantics, rather than of substance. The PBA may demand that 
unit employees not be required to ride in unsafe vehicles. Insofar as this 
demand may be construed to go beyond this, it is non-mandatory. Certainly the 
PBA cannot demand that a vehicle be removed from service, rather than assigned 
to a non-unit employee. 
Demand No. 5 - "No Superior Officer shall assign, direct, or order a member 
to operate a municipal vehicle which is mechanically deficient 
or does not satisfy the safety requirements of the New York 
State Vehicle Inspection Law." 
Both parties see this demand as being a paraphrase, and perhaps 
an elaboration, of Demand No. 4, for their arguments regarding it are the same 
as those regarding Demand No. 4; so is our conclusion. It is a mandatory subjec 
of negotiations to the extent that it involves safety. 
Demand No. 6 - "No member shall be assigned, directed, or ordered to do any 
type of repair on any Police patrol vehicle." 
This demand relates to job content. The Village argues that an 
agreement on job content would restrict its managerial prerogative to structure 
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a police department capable of performing all necessary work within the depart-
ment. We determine that job content of current employees is a mandatory subject 
of negotiations so long as the negotiations'demand would not narrow the inherent 
nature of the employment involved. The demand under question would not so 
narrow the nature of the work of policemen (gee Unconsolidated Laws §577-A.21). 
Demand No. 7 
In its brief to us, PBA withdrew Demand No. 7. Ordinarily, in 
deciding whether a party has negotiated in bad faith by insisting upon a non-
mandatory subject of negotiations during factfinding, the issue would not be 
mooted simply because the demand was subsequently withdrawn. Where, however, 
the matter is brought to us under §204.4 of our Rules, pursuant to which we 
resolve questions regarding the nature of mandatory subjects of negotiations, 
the withdrawal of a demand takes the issue away from us. 
Demand No. 8 - "If a member is investigated by any unit or appointee of this 
Department, he shall be notified at the completion of the 
investigation as to the results thereof." 
This demand goes too far, Police departments generally investigate 
suspected and actual crimes, including suspected and actual crimes by policemen. 
•\ policeman who is investigated for possible criminal conduct is in the same 
losition as is any other citizen. His rights are those that are afforded to him 
>y law, as interpreted by the courts. 
)emand No. 9 - "A. The Department shall destroy or give to the employee, at the 
Member's sole option, the original and all copies of any 
anonymous correspondence or memorandum in relation to phone calls 
received concerning violations of the Rules of Procedures by the 
Member. 
"B. The municipality shall not honor or investigate any 
anonymous complaint against any member." 
As in the case of Demand No. 4, it appears that the dispute is one 
>f semantics, rather than of substance. In its brief, PBA conceded that it 
an neither prevent the police department from receiving anonymous calls nor 
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require it to make all such calls known to the person claimed to have been 
derelict. It has, therefore, clarified its demand to preclude placing in the 
personnel file of an employee information received during an anonymous call 
unless the information is verified, and that only if such information is to be 
placed in the individual employee's file must he be made aware of it. For its 
part, the Village has written in its brief, "These proposals are far different 
from a legitimate demand involving the use of unsubstantiated material against 
an officer, e.g., the placing of such material in a personnel folder." Thus, 
there appears to be no disagreement as to scope of negotiations. 
Demand No. 10 - "A. No member shall be subject to any investigation, interro-
gation, or interview in relation to any type of disciplinary 
action without first being presented with a copy of an accusitary 
report, instrument, or document that is signed by the accusor. 
Upon receipt of the accusitary instrument, the member shall not 
be required, requested, or ordered to make any statement, written 
or oral, without being represented by the PBA. 
"B. Upon the receipt of any document described in Section A, 
the department will notify the member accused by furnishing 
him with a certified copy of the document. The member shall 
then be allowed reasonable time to contact and have present a 
PBA representative before any questioning takes place." 
To the extent that this demand applies to preliminary investiga-
tions , it is not a mandatory subj ect of negotiations. To the extent that it 
involves procedures during a disciplinary proceeding it is, provided, however, 
that the Village can only be compelled to negotiate over procedures not specified 
Ln law. Unconsolidated Laws §5711-Q.9 specifies certain details for disciplinary; 
proceedings involving policemen and leaves other details for rules and regula-
tions to be adopted by the employer. Insofar as it is discretionary, the con-
tent of those rules and regulations constitutes a mandatory subject of negotia-' 
:ions, but the Village cannot be compelled to negotiate for the inclusion in its 
contract of provisions identical with those in the statute, (See Matter- of City 
of New Roehe-l-le,;.8 ,PEB3 lf-3071 (1975)/ < -' ' • - a Hcit*j 4027 
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Demand No. 12 
PBA withdrew this demand in its brief to us. Our comments on 
Demand No. 7 apply. 
Demand No. 14 - "The municipality shall maintain an organizational structure 
which is based on the following: 
Chief of Police 
7 Lieutenants 
10 Sergeants 
5 Detective Patrolmen 
31 Police Patrolman" 
We have declared similar demands not to be mandatory subjects of 
negotiations in the White Plains decision, supra. The Court of Appeals has 
agreed in its Susquehanna Valley decision, supra. 
Demand No. 15 - "Any delay in cash benefits (salary, paid holidays, welfare 
benefits etc.) shall be subject to 6% penalty per month to be 
paid by the municipality upon payment of such cash benefit." 
General Municipal Law §3-a provides that the rate of interest to 
be paid by a municipal corporation for an approved claim against it shall not 
exceed 3% per annum. The demand herein for a 6% interest is, therefore, .a 
prohibi ted sub jec t of n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
Demand No. 16 
PBA withdrew this demand in its brief to us. Our comments on 
Demand No. 7 apply. 
Demand No. 17 - "The Department shall institute two-man patrol coverage." 
PBA had originally argued in favor of this demand on the ground 
that it was important to assure unit employees of adequate safety. It has, 
however, withdrawn that demand in favor of one that would require the Village 
put a screen between the front and back seats of cars so as to protect a one-
man patrolman from a prisoner. Apparently the Village resists this revised 
demand on its merits and not on the ground that it is not a mandatory subject 
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of negotiations; thus, in accordance with our comments on Demand No. 7, it is 
unnecessary for us to reach the question. 
Demand No. 18 - "A. Work Schedules shall be posted at least six (6) months 
in advance. 
B. In the event that a member's work schedule is changed 
and he received less than ninety (90) days notice o[f] the 
change, he shall be [co]mpensated the sum of one hundred 
dollars ($100) for the disruption of his family and personal 
life to be paid within thirty (30) days of his notification 
of change of work schedule. 
C. In no event may a member's schedule be changed without 
at least seven (7) days prior notice. 
D. All changes in work schedule must be in writing and 
delivered in person to the member." 
The Village argues against this demand on the ground that "It would 
restrict the Village from ever changing officers' work schedules." (emphasis in 
original). It also argues that the demand would prevent it from calling in 
necessary personnel in the event of an emergency. PBA responds that advance 
knowledge of a work schedule permits an employee to make preparations for use 
of his leisure time. It argues that the demand is not designed to interfere 
with the authority of a police department to call in policemen in the event of 
an emergency. Except for paragraph C of the demand, the dispute involves the 
merits of the proposal, rather than the mandatory nature of its negotiability. 
On its face, paragraph C might prevent the Village from calling in policemen in 
the event of an emergency and, to the.: extent .only it is not a mandatory subject 
of negotiations. 
Demand No. 20 
PBA withdrew this demand in its brief to us. Our comments on 
Demand No. 7 apply. 
Demand No. 21 - "All patrol vehicles shall be equipped with air conditioning 
as agreed to in previous negotiations." 
The Village argues that, because the availability of air condi-
tioning in patrol vehicles has no safety implications, it is not a mandatory 
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subject of negotiations. The PBA responds that the availability of air condi-
tioning affects the comfort of employees and is thus a term and condition of 
employment which is subject to mandatory negotiations. We agree with the PBA. 
The Village's objections are more properly directed to the merits of the demand 
than to its negotiability. 
Conclusion 
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the above conclusions of law^ we dismiss 
the charge with respect to all those matters considered herein that we 
determined to be mandatory subjects of negotiations, and with respect to those 
matters that we determined not to be mandatory subjects of negotiations, 
WE ORDER the Scarsdale Police Benevolent Association, Inc. to 
negotiate in good faith with the Village of Scarsdale. 
Dated: New York, New York 
November 7, 1975 
Fred L. Denson 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2B-11/7/75 
BALDWIN SANITARY DISTRICT NO. 2, : 
Respondent, . BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
- and -
:
 Case No. U-1236 
NICHOLAS PETRO and NASSAU CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.. : 
Charging Parties. : 
This case involves a charge that the employer, Baldwin Sanitary 
District No. 2 (employer) (a) discriminatorily discharged Nicholas Petro, 
a temporary employee, in violation of Sections 209_a.l(a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act)-p (b) that the employer unilaterally 
decreased the percentage increase contractually provided for in violation 
2 
of Sections 209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Act.— 
The hearing officer found (a) that Petro's termination was discrimina-
torily motivated and constituted a violation of Section 209-a.l(c) of the Act; 
JL These sections of the Act make it an improper employer practice to deliber-
ately "(a) interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exer-
cise of their rights guaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose 
of depriving them of such rights;... (c) to discriminate against any employee 
for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in, or partici-
pation in the activities of, any employee organization;...." 
2. As originally filed, the charge alleged that Petro had been threatened with 
layoff if he persisted in seeking CSEA's assistance in clarifying his 
employment status with the District. 
Both the original and the amended charge contain a second count alleging 
that the District improperly refused to check off dues from Petro on behalf 
of CSEA. However, the uncontradicted evidence establishes that neither CSEA 
nor Petro had ever requested dues checkoff and Petro had never even executed 
a checkoff authorization card. The hearing officer dismissed this charge. 
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(b) that the employer's unilateral action in not implementing the contractual 
increase violated Section 209_a.l(d) of the Act, 
The employer filed exceptions to the hearing officer's decision and 
recommended order, We have reviewed the filed exceptions and do not find them 
meritorious. We affirm and adopt the findings, conclusions and recommended 
order. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER: 
(1) With respect to the violation of CSL Sections 209~a.l(a) 
and (c) that Baldwin Sanitary District No,: 2 restore the 
status quo as it existed in August, 197^ by (a) offering 
Petro employment with it on the same basis as he was 
employed during August, 197^; (b) making Petro whole 
for any loss of earnings as a result of his termination; 
and (c) reconsidering Petro's appointment to permanent 
full-time status in a manner consistent with the findings 
of fact herein; 
(2) With respect to the violation of CSL Section 209'-a.l(d), in 
view of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and in 
view of the specific violation of the Act that we have found 
to have occurred, the Baldwin Sanitary District No, 2 shall 
negotiate in good faith with the Nassau Chapter, Civil 
Service Employees Assjjcj-a-iion^  Inc. 
Dated: New York, New York 
November 7, 1975 
;j. rw I far 
Tr'ed L, Densbn ^ ^ ~ 
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CONCURRING OPINION 
I concur in the result reached by my associates. 
As to the violations of CSL Section 209-a.l(a) and (c), I agree 
with their analysis. As to the violation of CSL Section 209~a.l(d) my 
analysis differs from theirs, 
I do not find a violation based upon a failure to implement fully 
the contractual obligations in view of the uncertainties expressed by the Cost 
of Living Council. The directives of that body were rather imprecise and I 
would not impose the stigma of statutory violation upon those who had to act 
in the face of such official uncertainty. However, I find that subsequent 
to the expiration of Federal controls, the employer's failure to furnish 
information as to its alleged compliance with its contractual obligations 
was a violation of its duty to negotiate in good faith. 
Dated: New York, New York ^ 
November 7j 1975 /^/ 
Joseph W. Crowley 
]_. See also my dissent in Matter of Town of Orangetown, 8 PERB 3063 at 3072. 
